Eight years after U.S. and coalition forces invaded Afghanistan with the stated mission of ousting the Taliban fundamentalist regime, finding Osama Bin Laden and the other Al Qaeda leaders who had claimed responsibility for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and destroying the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, the outcome of foreign involvement in Afghanistan remains unclear, and the situation in Afghanistan bleak. Despite the initial retreat of the Taliban and the recent establishment of democratic elections and a democratically elected government, Afghan security still fails to meet U.S. and coalition standards for stability and self-reliance. Taliban insurgents continue to wage a bloody war with the occupying forces; corruption runs rampant in every level of government; and the life of the average Afghan remains one of poverty and insecurity. This lack of definitive improvement serves as an indictment of U.S. and coalition tactics in the region. The current military approach to democratizing and stabilizing Afghanistan is failing to achieve the desired outcomes of peace, stability, democracy, and improved human rights for Afghans; to create a more stable and secure Afghanistan, more attention and resources must be directed towards education, development, and infrastructure, thus concretely improving the lives of the Afghan people.
An examination of recent Afghan history demonstrates the importance of both properly administered foreign aid and liberalized governance to achieving a peaceful Afghanistan. According to journalist Thomas J. Billitteri, in the 1960s, late in the reign of Crown Prince Mohammed Zahir Shah, "Zahir...pressed for political freedoms that included new rights for women in voting, schooling, and employment" (681-682). Though his reforms were not universally popular, they, and the infusion of Soviet and American funds directed towards infrastructure building and improvement, produced a "rare long period of peace...recalled now with immense nostalgia" (Billitteri 682). Unfortunately for Zahir and Afghanistan, "peace was not accompanied by prosperity" (Billitteri 682), and soon after his ouster, the country collapsed into internal strife, setting the stage for the troubles that would follow.
The violence that followed Zahir's fall from power had lasting consequences. "Between 1979 and the Soviet withdrawal in 1989," Billitteri writes, "some 14,500 Soviets died" (682), and, even more significantly, "the [Soviet-Afghan] war was a bloodbath that all but destroyed the economy and educational system and uprooted much of the [Afghan] population" (Billitteri 682). Worse still, the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, instead of allowing peace to return to the region, prompted the United States to withdraw its support for Afghanistan. Thus, in the absence of foreign aid and an established, stable government, and still reeling from the violence of the war with the Soviets, Afghanistan became ripe for regional conflict and the eventual rise of the Taliban.
The rise of the Taliban illustrates the importance of establishing law and order to the Afghan people. The Taliban's rise "stemmed directly from the chaos wracking Afghanistan" (Billitteri 683) and "succeeded in establishing law and order throughout most of the country" (Billitteri 683), establishing its own legitimacy in the process. Today, although the Taliban no longer rules Afghanistan, the organization continues to attract followers willing to fight in the insurgency, against which U.S. and coalition forces now use tactics, such as air strikes which often kill innocent bystanders, that may, as journalist Chalmers Johnson points out, "turn the Afghan people and the Islamic world further against the United States" (Johnson).
The chaos, lack of infrastructure, and lawlessness of Afghanistan today all contribute to the continuing violence and volatility of the region. As history demonstrates, military attempts by foreign powers to seize control of the region, from Britain to the U.S.S.R., inevitably fail and often leave Afghanistan in worse condition than before. Therefore, rather than continuing to focus on military efforts to fight and defeat rebel forces, efforts which foster an environment of bloodshed and contribute little to the creation of a stable, long-term infrastructure, U.S. and coalition forces should divert resources and attention to creating a better Afghanistan, one with a government, infrastructure, economy, and educational system capable of maintaining law and order, which will lend itself to a long-lasting peace, out of which prosperity and advancement can grow.
The Obama administration's stated approach to Afghanistan may help move the conflict in the right direction. The administration plans to provide "aid to build up [Afghanistan's] social and political infrastructure and democratic institutions" (Billitteri 672), and to increase "the number of agricultural specialists, educators, engineers, and lawyers" (Billitteri 672) to aid in the establishment of the new Afghan government and infrastructure. This reflects a shift in U.S. priorities to the long-term well-being of Afghanistan. U.S. commitment to that long-term well-being may, in the end, prove more effective at establishing peace and at preventing the rise of another militant, fundamentalist regime, like the Taliban, than traditional military strategies would. A country which we have helped achieve peace and self-sufficiency will view the United States more favorably, after all, than a country whose infrastructure we have assisted in destroying, without leaving any improvements behind. Therefore, both to achieve peace in Afghanistan and to minimize anti-American sentiment in the region, we must focus on rebuilding the country and helping the people, rather than on destroying villages and killing our opponents. Only then can a truly successful long-term outcome be won.
Works Cited
Billitteri, Thomas J. "Afghanistan Dilemma." CQ Researcher, 7 Aug 2009: Web. 22 Oct. 2009.
Johnson, Chalmers. "Three Good Reasons to Liquidate Our Empire and Ten Steps to Take to Do So." Peace Resource Center of San Diego, 30 July 2009. Web. 22 Oct. 2009.
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