To understand the current tensions between China and Taiwan, one must first understand the divergence in their histories. In “Japan-Taiwan Relations: Between Affinity and Reality,” Peng-Er Lam explains that “Imperial Japan seized Taiwan...after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and ruled Taiwan until its defeat in World War II in 1945” (2). Shortly afterwards, civil war broke out on the mainland between the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT). As Robert Sutter writes in Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War, “the United States government sided with [KMT leader] Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese communists...ending with the communist victory on the Chinese mainland in 1949 and Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Taiwan” (Sutter 64). Mainland China came under communist control and became the People's Republic of China or PRC, while “2 million Nationalists fled to Taiwan and established a government” (“Taiwan”) over what would become known as the Republic of China, or ROC. Since then, Taiwan has functioned as a separate political entity from China. China, however, refuses to acknowledge Taiwan's sovereignty. The PRC's one-China policy, in fact, claims Taiwan as a Chinese territory, rejects Taiwan's independence, and insists that other nations and organizations within the global community follow suit. Today, China continues “to give high priority to competing with Taiwan for international recognition, even in remote third world areas...Much of China's effort in the third world seemed designed to compete diplomatically with Taiwan for recognition” (Sutter 45-46).
Thus far, China has restrained itself primarily to diplomatic tactics in its conflict with Taiwan, rather than military aggression, in large part due to its ambitions in the global community. Sutter describes the PRC's ambitions:
Beijing wished to be seen as the leading power in Asia and not as lower in prestige or regional influence than its neighbors...China's leaders [also] desired status and prestige among the community of nations. They intended China to be a major player in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the WTO, and other key international institutions. (38)To do so required China to gain the support of other world powers, most notably the United States. Perhaps to protect American economic interests in both China and Taiwan, however, Washington has, according to Philip C. Saunders, “tried to avoid taking sides in the dispute over Taiwan’s status” (19), although “as the military balance has shifted in China’s favor, the United States has become more directly involved in protecting Taiwan’s security. China now assumes that the United States would intervene if a conflict broke out” (Saunders 19), an outcome the PRC hopes to avoid.
That does not mean, however, that the PRC has entirely avoided military aggression against Taiwan. In 1995, incensed by the Clinton administration's decision to allow Lee Teng-hui, at the time the president of Taiwan, to visit the United States, the Chinese government instigated “nine months of military tensions in the Taiwan Straits” (Sutter 138). Chinese military activities during those months included “frequent live-fire military exercises [and] ballistic missile tests near Taiwan's ports” (Sutter 138). Sutter describes the outcome of the tensions:
The military actions cowed Taiwan for a few months, until the United States eventually sent two carrier battle groups to observe PRC exercises--a sign that boosted Taiwan's morale and underlined for Beijing the potentially dangerous consequences of provocative military action against Taiwan. (Sutter 191)Washington's intervention served as a reminder to the PRC of the possible repercussions of direct action against Taiwan. Since then, the PRC has “not repeated threatening actions such as firing ballistic missiles toward Taiwan. This reflects Beijing’s awareness of the high costs of using or threatening to use force [against Taiwan]” (Saunders 8). The PRC continues, however, to pursue diplomatic methods of pressuring Taiwan towards reunification.
The diplomatic pressures China exerted against Taiwanese independence revolved around preventing Taiwan from gaining international recognition as a sovereign entity. By the mid-1990s, “reducing Taiwan's diplomatic stature was the most important issue of immediate concern to Chinese foreign policy makers” (Sutter 191). The PRC “relied heavily on its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to insure that its interests were protected” (Sutter 117), using its influence and veto power to “[block] Taiwan from gaining entry into the United Nations or UN-affiliated organizations” (Sutter 118) and isolate Taiwan from the international community. Sutter lists some of the PRC's diplomatic tactics against Taiwan:
Beijing in January 1997 used its veto power...to block approval for UN peacekeepers in Guatemala until Guatemala agreed to reduce its support for Taiwan's efforts to gain UN entry. In 1999, China [blocked] the continuation of UN peacekeeping operations in Macedonia, which had recently established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. (Sutter 120)Essentially, Beijing hoped to isolate Taiwan “to whittle away Taiwan's shrinking band of diplomatic allies. Thus, China in 1999 used its veto power to bar UN peacekeepers from Haiti until the government there modified its traditionally strong support for Taiwan” (Sutter 191-192). It seems clear that the threat of American disapproval failed to deter China from its commitment to reunification with Taiwan, even at the expense of the welfare of other nations.
In its efforts to isolate Taiwan, the PRC refrained only from the use of economic pressure. Despite political antagonism, economic ties between China and Taiwan benefited both nations: Taiwanese investment in China accounted for nearly $40 million of China's direct foreign investment in 2004, making Taiwan the third-largest investor in China (Sutter 95), and Taiwan also counted as one of the top three sources of imports to China (Sutter 96). Additionally, “efforts to pressure Taiwan’s economy would affect companies and countries around the world, producing international pressure against the Chinese government” (Saunders 16). Saunders writes:
China is also vulnerable to economic pressure as it becomes more dependent on exports to the U.S. market. China enjoyed a $162 billion dollar trade surplus with the United States in 2004. China may be willing to bear high costs to prevent Taiwan independence, but the evidence to date suggests that leaders in Beijing will be reluctant to use economic coercion or force against Taiwan. … Chinese leaders are reluctant to start a war that might derail their country’s economic modernization. (Saunders 16)Ultimately, China's economic pragmatism protects Taiwan from attacks on what may be its greatest strategic asset: its economy.
Taiwan, however, has more to offer the global community than mere prosperity. Since the emergence of political liberalization following the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan has developed into a multiparty democracy. That democratization has “led a rapidly expanding number of Taiwanese non-profit and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to take part in transnational activities,” as Chen Jie writes in “Civil Society, Grassroots Aspirations and Diplomatic Isolation” (Friedman 110). Through these NGOs, Taiwan can participate meaningfully in global efforts to combat “environmental, human rights, gender and development issues” (Friedman 111) despite exclusion from international governing bodies. Taiwan can also “tackle concerns it shares with other countries (from child prostitution and climate change to human trafficking and humanitarian relief)” (Friedman 112), some of which China has so far failed to meaningfully address (“China”). Taiwanese NGOs also improve conditions within Taiwan's own borders, as women's NGOs did when their campaigning led to the passage of a Gender Equality Labour Law in 2001 (Friedman 116). Unfortunately, “Taiwanese NGOs are challenged by the international community's continuing non-recognition of the Taiwanese state” (Friedman 116) due to the PRC, which “systematically obstructs Taiwanese NGOs” (Chen 117) through political exclusion, just as it obstructs ROC recognition in global governing bodies. The PRC's use of such tactics deprive the international community of the assistance Taiwan could provide against environmental and humanitarian problems affecting the world. This shows Beijing's willingness to neglect or even jeopardize solutions to urgent global issues in its pursuit of reunification.
Despite PRC pressures, however, “opinion polls consistently indicate that a majority of Taiwan voters favor maintaining the status quo rather than...moving toward reunification” (Saunders 4). Additionally, in post-democratization years, there has been a “shift toward increasing consciousness of a Taiwan national identity separate from China” (Saunders 5). Saunders elaborates:
Many nationalists have made a conscious effort to define “Taiwan identity” in opposition to “Chinese identity,” rather than as a supplemental identity (such as the way local Guangdong or Jiangsu provincial identities coexist with Chinese identity in the PRC). Taiwan nationalists have consciously sought to reshape school curricula to emphasize Taiwan history, language, and culture. … [There exists a] perceived fusion between a Taiwan national identity and support for independence. (Saunders 6)Of course, as the Taiwanese national identity develops and becomes further removed from previous perceptions of Chinese identity, “the prospect of China persuading Taiwan to accept reunification becomes remote” (Saunders 6).
With the solidification of Taiwan's national identity comes the solidification of Taiwan's separation from the PRC's attitudes towards other world powers, such as towards the United States. While the PRC and the United States enjoy strong economic ties and an overtly friendly diplomatic relationship, “at the start of the twenty-first century, the list of Chinese charges and grievances against [perceived] U.S. hegemonism was long and involved many issues of direct concern to China and nearby Asia” (Sutter 69). Sutter notes:
Specialists from the United States and other countries...note the Chinese desire to work against and protect China from many perceived negative aspects of U.S. policy and behavior towards China. ... Many of the Chinese specialists who dealt with U.S. affairs had a strong prejudice toward the United States as a hegemonic power driven by the desire for world domination. (Sutter 65)This prejudice makes the PRC resistant to cooperation with the United States and its allies on issues such as Chinese human rights violations and arms distribution, illustrating “the limits of China's accommodation to international norms. China continued to transfer sensitive military technology...to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and other potential flash points, despite criticism from Western countries” (Sutter 22). In fact, “Chinese nationalism [pushed] Chinese policy in directions that resisted U.S. international leadership...the power of the United States, and U.S. allies in East Asia, notably Japan, and Taiwan” (Sutter 30). This attitude bodes poorly for China's continued and productive participation in U.S. and international efforts to improve humanitarian conditions and promote human rights and freedoms, and calls into question the United States's commitment to those rights and freedoms, given Washington's reluctance to give up its conciliatory stance towards the PRC.
That conciliatory stance, the corruption scandals that disgraced former Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian and led to his pro-independence Democratic People's Party's loss in the 2008 Taiwanese presidential elections, and the restoration to power of the traditionally more PRC-friendly KMT all indicate that the time is ripe for another move towards reunification. On the 16th of November, 2009, the Xinhua news agency reported that “China's top political adviser Jia Qinglin on Monday urged a visiting Hong Kong delegation to make more contribution to the reunification of China...and resolutely oppose any form of separatist activities for 'Taiwan independence'” (“China's Jia Qinglin”). For a high-level official to publicly discuss reunification seems to indicate Chinese confidence that it will happen, despite Taiwanese resistance. This supports the widespread perception “that Chinese leadership confidence in foreign affairs had grown with the increase in Chinese wealth and prominence and with growing Chinese international success in Asian and world affairs” (Sutter 13). As China continues its economic dominance of the world economy, that confidence will continue to grow. It is not impossible that eventually “Chinese leaders may decide...to use force to stop [Taiwanese] independence” (Saunders 8). If that happens, will the United States support China, a major trading partner guilty of human rights abuses the U.S. and other developed nations claim to oppose, or Taiwan, the democracy whose ideology much more closely matches the rest of the developed world's?
An examination of Congressional support for Taiwan is encouraging. In “Economics, Lobbying, and U.S. Congressional Support for Taiwan,” Joshua Su-Ya Wu writes:
In the U.S. political landscape, Congress is arguably Taiwan’s greatest proponent and most reliable supporter. … From the 1950s to the 1980s...the China lobby actively sought to shape and influence U.S. policy in the Far East... [and] worked fervently to ... stabilize and codify continued U.S. support for Taiwan. In the 1980s and 1990s, the China lobby ... was replaced by a Taiwan lobby. … The Taiwan lobby has also consolidated more formalized support in Congress. In 2002, the Congressional Taiwan Caucus was launched, followed by the Senate Taiwan Caucus in 2003. … There is bipartisan support for Taiwan, including by co-chairs from both the Republican and Democratic parties. (381-382)In fact, “the U.S. Congress has emerged as one of the island’s most loyal and influential supporters. … Contemporary supporters praise Taiwan’s democratic development, economic vitality, and cultural richness (Wu 385). Wu goes on to detail Congress's legislative support of Taiwan:
In the past decade, members of Congress have also advocated full Taiwanese independence, condemned the PRC for its cross-strait aggression, and argued the merits of normalizing relations with Taiwan. Furthermore, Congress has passed resolutions urging U.S. support for Taiwanese membership in the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations. In 2000, the House passed the controversial Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which...made more explicit how the U.S. should...help Taiwan defend itself and secure weaponry. The bill never made it to the Senate floor, so it remains a House resolution. (388)Unfortunately, President Obama's recent declaration of support for the PRC's one-China policy indicates that Congressional efforts on behalf of Taiwanese independence are inadequate to secure the administration's full support for Taiwan. Despite its environmental and humanitarian shortcomings, the PRC remains too dominant an economic power to fully oppose. Weakening that economic dominance requires a concerted, collective effort to avoid purchasing goods or making investments that will benefit the PRC. The only way to persuade enough consumers to do so is to convince them of what is truly at stake: the freedom, independence, and sovereignty of a democratic nation. Those members of Congress who work for Taiwanese recognition and sovereignty, as well as all the people aware of the situation and the consequences for Taiwan should reunification become a reality--consequences such as the loss of basic personal and intellectual freedoms and the imposition of autocratic, communist rule in Taiwan--must educate American consumers on the cost to Taiwanese freedom of saving a few dollars by buying products from China. Consumers need compelling reasons to support Taiwanese independence in the face of PRC reunification plans. Only when given those reasons will they consider acting to weaken the PRC's trade dominance, and only by weakening the PRC's trade dominance can the global community weaken the PRC's ability to isolate and eventually annex Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwanese NGOs and supporters of independence within the Taiwanese government must increase efforts to participate in the resolution of global humanitarian crises and maintain positive relationships with international allies to further prove the value of the ROC within the global community. International recognition of Taiwan will strike a strong blow at the arrogance of the PRC, and may eventually lead to greater freedoms within China's borders, as well as without. Not only for the future of Taiwan, but also for the future of democracy in Asia, the United States as a nation must take a stand against the PRC's insistence on reunification with Taiwan.
Works Cited
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Chen, Jie. “Civil society, grassroots aspirations and diplomatic isolation.” Friedman 110-129. Print.
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